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ABSTRACT
Regardless of culture, socio-economic background, and quality of life, all students
deserve the highest quality of education. But the reality is, many education systems around the
world do not offer it. Investing in structural reforms in education has the potential to boost
economic growth in countries around the world. By learning from different education systems
strengths and weaknesses, policy decisions can be made that ensure students are given the
opportunity for higher educational outcomes. This study analyzes high, middle, and low quality
education systems around the world and the infrastructures that lead to educational success or
failure. Fifteen education systems are chosen for this study which includes Shanghai-China,
Singapore, Japan, Finland, Canada, Portugal, United States, Luxembourg, Spain, Hungry, Brazil,
Argentina, Indonesia, Qatar, and Peru. Each system is analyzed in terms of its teacher quality,
curriculum, school system structure, and educational equity. From this study, it appears that there
is a high-correlation between four indicators and top- educational success. These four indicators
include having a highly selective model for hiring teachers, recruiting teachers from a top-pool
of graduates, having a high-level of prestige held for teachers in society, and insuring students of
low socio-economic status are given equal educational opportunities for success.
Recommendations for a new teacher training and selection model are discussed based on the top
four indicators. These recommendations could cause educational gains for both the United
States and other systems around the world.
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Introduction
All humans, regardless of culture, socio-economic background, and quality of life need
access to the highest quality education and the opportunity to succeed in the increasingly
interconnected global workforce (OECD, 2011d). Investing in structural reforms in education
and skills development to boost productivity in the workplace is key to future economic growth
in all countries around the world (OECD, 2011d). Learning from common educational strengths
and weaknesses is crucial towards achieving an effective global market, and ensuring
investments are being made towards the success of all citizens around the globe.
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Purpose
The purpose of my study is to analyze high, middle, and low quality education systems around
the world and the infrastructures that lead to educational success or failure. This study examines
common factors in government systems and school curricula demonstrated in the literature to
represent education quality. For my study, I analyze five top-performing, five-middle
performing, and five-low performing education systems. These fifteen education systems include
Shanghai-China, Singapore, Japan, Finland, Canada, Portugal, United States, Luxembourg,
Spain, Hungary, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Qatar, and Peru.1 Recommendations for a new
teacher training and selection model are discussed based on the top four indicators. These
recommendations could cause educational gains for both the United States and other systems
around the world.
These policy recommendations could help move middle performing regions towards
achieving comparable results of high performing regions, and assist low performing systems
towards reaching similar results of mid performing systems. In addition, a detailed policy
program for the United States education system is made based off of the research findings. While
it is impossible to come up with an exact combination of education policies and practices that
would create educational success for all regions, it is indeed possible and necessary to pinpoint
trends in best practices and policies that can assist policy makers close educational gaps.

Although Shanghai is a city instead of a country, the city of Shanghai has an education system that differs from the
rest of China and functions with its own education policies. Singapore, although not a country but a micro state,
functions with its own education policies as well.

1
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Literature Review
Since 2000, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
conducted the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) which has become the
world’s most trusted measure in evaluating efficiency, quality, and equity of school systems
(OECD, 2012c). PISA’s statistical benchmarking and comparisons to other systems allows local
governments to identify effective policies they can adapt in their own countries (OECD, 2012d).
PISA first analyzed the education systems of 32 countries in 2003, and by 2012 the study
expanded to 65 countries and economies (OECD, 2012c). 2 3 Extensive resources and efforts are
dedicated towards attaining a linguistic and cultural balance in PISA assessment materials. As
data collection and sampling in each country is subject to strict quality controls, PISA findings
are considered to be both highly dependable and valid (OECD, 2012c).
The Programme for International Student Assessment focuses on mathematics, science,
reading and problem solving, and for the first time in 2012, PISA also included an assessment of
financial literacy (OECD, 2012c). In 2012 math was PISA’s major focus area. For PISA, math
proficiency is measured by the “capacity of individuals to formulate, employ and interpret
mathematics in a variety of contexts” (OECD, 2012c). The term “math proficiency” describes
the capacities of individuals to reason mathematically and use mathematical procedures,
The OECD countries participating in the 2012 PISA study include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,
Solvenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and The United States (OECD, Singapore:
Thinking Ahead, 2012).
3
Partner countries and economies in PISA 2012 include Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Hong Kong-China, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, MacaoChina, Malaysia, Montenegro, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Shanghai-China, Singapore,
Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, and Viet Nam (OECD, Singapore: Thinking
Ahead, 2012).
2
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concepts, and tools to describe and predict phenomena (OECD, 2012c). PISA mathematics has
been measured five times since 2000. This gives the chance to analyze changes in performance
by students in mathematics in the context of policies, teacher development, and other educational
factors (OECD, 2012c). PISA does not only assess whether or not students are able to reproduce
knowledge but whether or not they are able to take the knowledge that they have learned and
apply it to new situations. The test places heavy emphasis on the capability to understand
processes and concepts, as well as the skill of applying processes and concepts to various
situations (OECD, 2012c). In 2012, close to 510,000 15-year olds completed the assessment.
This represented about 28 million students in the schools of the 65 participating countries
(OECD, 2012c).
The PISA test lasts two hours for each student for paper-based tests, with an extra 40
minutes for math, reading, and problem computer-based assessments (OECD, 2012c). The test
involved a combination of both multiple-choice based questions, as well as free-response
questions that required students to construct their own answers. The questions in the test were
organized into passages involving a real-life scenario (OECD, 2012c). Students also completed a
30 minute background questionnaire that gave insight into their school and learning experiences,
homes, and personal lives. In some countries optional questionnaires were also distributed to
parents asking them to provide information on their involvement in their child’s learning
environment and career expectations. In addition, school principals were each given a 30-minute
questionnaire covering information on the school system and educational environment (OECD,
2012c). PISA test results are used to examine how academic performance is associated with
characteristics of school systems and individual schools (OECD, 2012c). OECD publications
10

analyze trends in variables of the learning environment, and also discuss effective policy reform
efforts implemented by countries that have improved their assessment scores (OECD, 2012c).
United States Education
In the United States, students have shown no significant changes on the PISA test in math
since 2003, the first year in which mathematics trends were measured. There has also been no
significant change in science since 2006, and no significant changes in reading since 2000
(OECD, 2011d). The United States has remained stagnant—while other countries have pulled
ahead. It is critical that you and I analyze what factors are creating positive educational outcomes
in higher-performing education systems and which of these factors we have the capability of
implementing in our own county before we fall further behind. The wealth of the United States
means that it has the capability of spending much more on education, but we must assure that we
find ways to allocate money into education in areas where it can actually make the most
difference. It is logical that the best way to find these areas would be to analyze where resources
are pooled in the top performing education systems.
Education Systems Around The World
The OECD has done extensive research on different educational factors of each
participating country participating in the PISA study that gives me a solid foundation for my
research. Along with international work created by other researchers, literature is explored
discussing educational factors of each of the fifteen education systems chosen for analysis.
Literature regarding each education system is examined, leading into a discussion on common
denominators found. Shanghai and Hong Kong: Learning to Learn looks at how the education
11

system of Shanghai has benefited from the economic growth and how this has impacted their
educational reform. This publication discusses upgrading their teaching standards, curriculum
choices, and greater autonomy for local education authorities (OECD, 2012b). The section of
Lessons from PISA for Japan titled, “Singapore: Thinking Ahead” works similarly. This
publication discusses Singapore’s prevailing belief in central education systems, and the
importance of building school reform on a local level through teacher leadership “Japan: A Story
of Sustained Excellence, gives Japan’s education story—why they have always been near the top
of international rankings since surveys began, their focus on instruction and strong incentives to
take tough courses, as well as their system of teacher accountability (OECD, 2011c). Finland: A
non-Competitive Education for a Competitive Economy analyzes the incredible success of
Finland’s education system for the past decade, focusing on their education policies that favor
informality, networking and co-operation emphasis, as well as the importance the place on strong
teaching skills (OECD, 2014a).
The first middle-performing country publication I analyze is the OECD Reviews of
Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Portugal 2012’s chapter titled, “School Education in
Portugal” discussing educational practices that place them slightly below the OECD average.
They explain details regarding Portugal’s curriculum, national examinations, and school
infrastructure centrally run by the Ministry of Education and Science (Santiago, 2012).
“Concepts, policies and practices of teacher education: an analysis of studies on teacher
education in Portugal” is also useful in understanding Portugal’s education context, as it explains
the guidelines for teacher education. The report argues the importance of education for social
justice in Europe, and focuses on the importance of placing teachers at the center of education
12

reform (Pereira, 2013). Another great source on Portugal’s education system for use is “First
Impressions of the Reorganisation of the School network in Portugal.” This article provides a
retrospective on the reorganization of the school system in Portugal between 2005 and 2007,
which was designed to create greater educational outcomes. It reports that teachers question the
improvements to quality of teaching, as no major changes were found in Portugal for teacherlearning conditions (Ferreira & Fonseca, 2009). Lessons from PISA for the United States gives
me a strong basis for factors that affect U.S. education including its need for high-quality
teachers, high emphasis on standardized testing, and the gap that exists between low and highincome students (OECD, 2011d). “School Education in Luxembourg” from OECD Reviews of
Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Luxembourg 2012 discusses Luxembourg’s highly
stratified school system that contains very limited school choice for both parents and students,
high incidence of grade repetition, and the problems that exist in their pedagogical structure
(Shewbridge, 2012). An analysis on Hungary’s education system is found in “Hungary Adopts
Quality Tools For Public Education.” This article lays out model created by the Hungarian
Ministry of Culture and Education to “promote mutual learning by spreading best practices and
enabling teachers to pass on the knowledge, skills and experiences they acquired in the field of
quality improvement”(Molnar-Stadler, 2002). “The Roma/Non-Roma Test Score Gap in
Hungary” documents the gap disappearance in reading between Roma and non-Roma students in
2006, once school fixed effects, health, and parenting are taken into account (Kertesi & Gaabor,
2011). “Educational disparities across regions: A multilevel analysis for Italy and Spain” will be
useful in my research, as it discusses Spain’s internal regional heterogeneity, and educational
policy-making (Agasisti & Cordero-Ferrera, 2013). “The Education of Immigrant Youth: Some
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Lessons From the U.S. and Spain” is also valuable, as it discusses the paralleled unwelcoming
nature towards immigrant youth in Spain, and how this same unwelcoming nature is often
parallel in the United States (Gibson & Carrasco, 2009). Grade retention in countries is also
important to analyze, as is done in “Does grade retention affect students’ achievement? Some
evidence from Spain.” Much of this article points to suffering effects.
My literature review on low-performing systems begins with “Decentralising education
in Indonesia”, which analyses the disparities that exist in the Indonesian school system, and
reports belief that there have been a number of negative consequences due to the decentralization
of their education sector (Stein & Pratikno, 2006). “Education in Indonesia” is also beneficial to
my research, as it gives information regarding quality of teachers, teacher absenteeism, and
school local-level governance, reaching the conclusion that clear challenges lie ahead in
Indonesian school reform (Yean, 2014). Information on Argentina’s education system is found
in “Families, schools and primary-school learning: evidence for Argentina and Colombia in an
international perspective.” This article points out a lack of performance differences between rural
and urban areas of Argentina, and discusses findings that there is little relation between
Argentine school performance and school resource endowments (Wößmann, 2010). “Autonomy,
Participation and learning: Finds from Argentine Schools, and Implications for Decentralization”
gives valuable information as well. Education and Health Expenditure, and Development, The
Cases of Indonesia and Peru” gives educational assessments of both countries, focusing on their
centralized system and that in both countries the wealthy and middle-income households benefit
much stronger from educational resources than low-income households (OECD, Education and
Health Expenditure, and Development: The Cases of Indonesia and Peru, 2002). “The impact of
14

structured teaching methods on the quality of education in Brazil” also discusses Brazil’s system.
Its finding are that Portuguese schools focusing on pedagogical methods involving structuring of
curriculum content and supervision of teachers outperform students not exposed to those
methods (Leme, Louzano, Ponczek, & Souza, 2012). Middle East Digest gives great insight into
one of my low-performing systems as well. The study reports results from questionnaires
addressed to 74 Qatar school leaders, shedding light on the lack of local educator’s input in
school reform ( Education, 2012). International Journal of Training & Development discusses the
negative impact on education from Qatar teacher’s lack of personal growth, self-reflection, and
collaboration in professional development (Nasser & Romanowski, Jun2011). The journal
article, “All that glitters is not gold: Challenges of teacher and school leader licensure licensing
system in Qatar” gives great insight into Qatar’s education as well—also pointing out their
tendency to ignore local educators’ input and lack of accounting for local Qatar culture in
importing educational products (Maha, Romanowski, & Nasser, 2012).
School System Variables
I am looking for common denominators between education systems in four different
areas. These areas are teacher quality, school system structure, school curriculum, and
educational equality. Teacher quality is the first education variable analyzed as it is repeatedly
cited as the most important schooling factor that influences student achievement (Goldhaber &
Liddle, 2013). Evidence shows that specific teacher training programs prove to be differentially
effective, with the differences substantial enough to greatly affect student outcomes (Goldhaber
& Liddle, 2013). As research indicates that raising teacher quality is likely the policy direction
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most probable to create gains in school performance, an analysis on teacher qualities that lead to
positive outcomes must be made. The OECD Publication Building a High-Quality Teaching
Profession reveals four interconnected themes with teachers: “how teachers are recruited into
the profession and trained initially; how teachers are developed in service and supported; how
teachers are evaluated and compensated; and how teachers are engaged in reform” (Schleicher,
2011).
For this study, each education system’s teacher quality is compared based on a variety of
principals related to the four interconnected themes established by the OECD. These variables
include whether or not teachers are recruited from the top pool of graduates in their region,
whether teaching is considered a highly-respected position in society, if receiving a teaching
position is highly selective, whether or not prospective teachers must graduate from a country’s
teacher education system, whether all teachers must hold a teaching-certificate, whether teachers
are required to hold a post-secondary degree to teach, whether teachers are required to have a
masters degree to teach, whether the ratio of upper-secondary teachers’ salaries at the top of
scale to starting salary is above or below the OECD average, and whether or not teachers are
required to complete extensive professional development.
School system structure is the next variable that is used to analyze the fifteen education
systems. How economies choose to distribute educational resources is an important aspect of
school system structure, as explained in OECD’s How do countries/economies allocate
educational resources? According to the OECD, school systems must balance the need for
sufficient levels of resources with other demands on public spending (OECD, 2011c). School
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systems often vary in how they choose to allocate their resources—from improving school
buildings, providing extracurricular activities, buying new textbooks, to ensuring smaller class
size (OECD, 2011c). According to OECD, there are four main groups of variables that effect
school funding: student number and grade level-based, needs based, curriculum based, and
school characteristics-based (Fazekas, 2012). Ten Steps to Equity in Education cites selection
policies in schools as important system structure factors that contribute to educational outcomes
as well (Field & Kuczera, 2007). The belief in this book is that differentiating students through
selection pathways actually creates greater educational inequality (Field & Kuczera, 2007). The
implantation of effective school leadership is cited as another key element of effective school
structure (Stoll & Temperley, 2010). According to Improving School Leadership, by refocusing
on roles that can improve school results, distributing school leadership to teams, and developing
effective leaders, school outcomes can be improved (Stoll & Temperley, 2010). It also states that
many school systems are stressing decentralization and school autonomy with their school
governance approaches (Stoll & Temperley, 2010). Based on the literature regarding school
systems and research conducted by the OECD Education GPS Education at a Glance 2014: Full
selection of indicators, as well as the OECD Education GPS: PISA 2012: Full selection of
indicators, each education system is compared based off whether it is funded predominantly by
a central government or by state or local government, whether the expenditure on educational
institutions as a percentage of GDP is higher or lower than the OECD average, whether
educational goals are determined predominantly by a state and local government or a national
Ministry of Education, whether or not the majority of students are in public or private schools,
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and whether the education system has an academic and vocational secondary school track, or
strictly academic.
Education equality is the third factor that I analyze for each school system. How
Management and Funding Relate to their Socio-economic Profile cite socio-economic
stratification in education systems is another important indicator of educational success or failure
(OECD, 2012b). According to the OECD, “countries with narrow socio-economic stratification
in their education systems not only maximize equity and social cohesion, but also perform well
in the PISA survey” (OECD, 2012a). Based off of quantitative research provided by OECD
Education GPS Education at a Glance 2014: Full selection of indicators, as well as the OECD
Education GPS: PISA 2012: Full selection of indicators, each education systems’ equality is
compared based on whether the student-teacher ratio among students in socio-economically
disadvantaged schools is higher or lower than the teacher-student ratio among students in socioeconomically advantaged schools, whether the percentage of students in the bottom quarter of
the PISA index for economic, cultural, and social status who perform in the top quarter of
students on PISA is above or below the OECD average, whether the percentage of immigrant
students in socio-economically disadvantaged schools is above or below the OECD average, and
whether or not the average PISA performances among students attending schools located in a
large city has more than a 10 point difference than students attending schools in a village or rural
area.
School curriculum is the fourth education variable that is used to analyze each school
system. Student Standardized Testing works to prove standardized tests as an important factor of

18

school curriculum, and gives empirical research that links standardized testing to learning and
teaching practices (Morris, 2011). This report also focuses on key debates on selecting
appropriate test purpose, teacher evaluation based on test results, the impact of standardized
testing, and minimizing strategic behavior by administrators and teachers in standardized testing
(Morris, 2011). The OECD believes high quality curriculum to be a key area towards creating
educational equality, so it is necessary to upgrade the subject content knowledge of teachers and
implement richer curricula in teacher education programs (OECD, 2011c). Bringing About
Curriculum Innovations-Implicit Approaches in the OECD Area discusses the belief that creating
innovation in education can be explored through the decision making of what and how students
are taught (Karkainen, 2012). The level of educational innovation in the classroom can be
affected by who is given the freedom to actually design the curriculum.
Based on my findings, the quantitative research in the OECD Education GPS Education
at a Glance 2014: Full selection of indicators, as well as the OECD Education GPS: PISA 2012:
Full selection of indicators, education curriculum is compared based off of whether teachers and
principals are given the responsibility of designing course content, whether principals are able to
choose which textbooks are used in the classroom, whether teachers and principals establish
assessment policies, whether principals and teachers decide which courses are offered in their
schools, whether a national assessment is given at the upper-secondary and lower-secondary
level, and whether compulsory instruction time for students is above or below average. The
websites for the national organizations Teach For America and Teach For All also gives insight
into highly-selective teacher recruitment models.
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Hypothesis
From this study, I hypothesize that teacher quality, development, and training will have
the highest correlations towards educational success. Based off of the education articles I have
read, positive educational outcomes can be reached when high teacher salary and prestige level
attract the most talented people into the field. By continuing to recruit the best and brightest into
the teaching force, and continuing to develop their teaching skills through extensive ongoing
training and development, this will be what pulls low and middle performing systems into
another trajectory. In addition to teacher quality, I theorize that a belief in all children’s
capability to achieve to the highest levels regardless of socioeconomic background will be the
other greatest determining factor of educational success. From the reports I have read on socioeconomic stratification and curriculum, I expect to find that in the most effective systems, there
will be a reoccurring pattern of both high and low socioeconomic students being held
accountable to the same standards and high quality of education. It is my inference that there
may be many different variations in effective systems regarding how resources are pooled and
tests are administered, but high teacher quality and educational equality for all will always be a
common denominator for chief outcomes. Using five systems for each category is a subjective
determination that gives a variety of GDP per capita and cultural contexts for each performance
category. I believe that using five systems for each category will give me the opportunity to
sense a strong pattern in educational factors that are correlated to positive or negative outcomes.
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Methodology
PISA 2012 results are examined to begin this study. PISA 2012 ranked sixty-five
countries and economies for math, science, and reading scores from highest to lowest scores.
Since math, science, and reading scores were ranked separately by PISA, I combine all three
subject scores together for each region to give one overall score. The scores are combined for
this study to look for educational outcomes as a whole instead of results for one particular
subject. Education systems are ranked by overall score from greatest to least-greatest. Shanghai,
China ranks highest with a 1,733 PISA score, and Peru ranks lowest with a 1,125 PISA score.
Between the highest and lowest performing systems tested, there is a 608 point score difference.
The median score is Spain, ranked number 33 with a score of 1,468. The mean score is 1,425.75.
As all 65 systems are listed from least to greatest, the education systems are split into three equal
categories: high-performing, middle-performing, and low-performing. High-performing is
considered rank number one through rank number twenty-one, middle-performing rank number
twenty-two through rank number forty-two, and low-performing rank number fourth-three
through rank number sixty-five. The high-performing category ranges from Shanghai, China
with a 1,733 score, to the United Kingdom with a 1,507 score. The middle-performing category
begins with Austria with a 1,502 score, and ends with Greece with a 1,397 score. The lowperforming category starts with Turkey with a 1,386 score, and ends with Peru with a 1,125
score. Tables A, B, and C located in the Appendices show each high, middle, and low
performing country’s 2012 combined PISA score and 2012 Global Domestic Product per capita
(GDP per capita).
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Each country’s 2012 GDP per capita listed from The World Bank is found to decide the
high performing, middle performing, and low performing education system choices. GDP per
capita is found for each region to ensure that there is a variety of different economic contexts
chosen in this study. It is important to pick a few regions that are high-performing with a
relatively low GDP per capita who are able to achieve high results regardless of the economic
resources they may lack. It is also necessary that a few low/ middle performing regions are
chosen with a relatively high GDP per capita who achieve low or middle results regardless of the
top economic resources they have acquired. By ensuring high, middle, and low performing
education systems are picked that deal with a variety of high and low economic contexts at each
performance level, it places focus on the effects of education system characteristics on
educational outcomes--opposed to the effects of regional wealth on educational outcomes.
Five high-performing, five middle-performing, and five-low performing systems are
chosen to analyze once each country is listed with their GDP per capita. For the five-high
performing systems, Shanghai- China, Singapore, Japan, Finland, and Canada are chosen. For
middle-performing systems, Portugal, The United States, Luxembourg, Spain, and Hungary are
chosen. Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Qatar, and Peru are the low-performing systems chosen.
Appendix D lists each of the fifteen education systems included in the study along with their
2012 combined PISA score and 2012 GDP per capita.
Shanghai is selected as a high-performing choice because of the city’s rise to the top
since 2006. Shanghai has experienced massive pedagogical changes and educational reform that
has caused it to outperform all other nations in 2012. I wish to explore exactly what these
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changes are that turned out to be so revolutionary for them. Singapore is also chosen as
Singapore’s overall 2012 score ranks number two. Singapore has often been ranked in the top
five for PISA scores and rose to its highest performance in 2012, so I am interested in what they
are doing to experience continual growth. Japan is the third choice as they receive a ranking of
number five for overall PISA score and have consistently ranked high over time. Japan has
managed to improve their scores over Finland who once held the number one ranking, so I am
curious as to what they have done to rise above competing economies. Analyzing Shanghai,
Singapore, and Japan, will paint a valuable picture of education style in the high-performing
Confucius circle. Finland is used as the fourth choice, ranking overall as number seven for PISA
scores. Finland has dropped from the very top in 2012, as they ranked number one and number
two in all subject areas in both 2003 and 2006, but regardless they have still consistently
obtained incredibly high educational outcomes. Their high teacher quality and development is
often discussed and reported, and this aspect of their education system is absolutely crucial for
my study. Canada is the fifth choice for high-performing, ranking number 11. Although there are
10 other education systems performing better than Canada, I want to ensure I have a wide variety
of cultural contexts in my high-performing systems.
The first middle-performing education system chosen is Portugal, ranking number
twenty-eight in overall PISA 2012 score. With a 2012 $20,175 GDP per capital, Portugal’s
economic resources rank relatively low compared to its surrounding ranks including Norway,
Denmark, and the United States, with $99,636, $56,364, $51,749, and $103,858 GDPs per
capita, respectively. Between 2003 and 2012, Portugal also has increased the share of top
performers and reduced its share of low performers, making it an important region to analyze.
23

The United States is my second choice, as it is the main passion I have for this study. As
discussed earlier, the American education system is failing us, and ranked as number 30 for 2012
overall PISA scores, it is crucial that we analyze what we are doing differently from higher
performing systems that is causing us to fall further and further behind. The third middle
performing education system to analyze is Luxembourg. Luxembourg ranks as number thirty-one
for 2012 overall PISA scores, and has a $103,858 GDP per capita—a higher GDP per capita than
any other country in the study besides Liechtenstein. With top economic resources they have the
capability to put extensive resources into their education system, and I am eager to see what they
are lacking that is keeping them behind. Next Spain is picked, ranking as number thirty-three for
their overall score. Spain is chosen as it is the country that is directly in the middle of highperforming and low-performing systems. Hungary is the last choice for middle-performing
education systems, taking the spot under Spain with number thirty-four overall 2012 PISA score.
Hungary is chosen because they have a $12,560 2012 GDP per capita for 2012, which is low
compared to its surrounding ranked regions. It is important to have a variety of high and low
GDP per capitas in the middle ranked system studied to ensure common denominators could be
found that are not directly in relation to economic constraints or freedoms.
Brazil and Argentina are chosen as the first and second low-performing education
systems to analyze, ranked as number fifty-seven and sixty for 2012 PISA scores, respectively.
Out of all of the lower-performing regions, I want to analyze these two as they both are in the
$11,000 GDP per capita range, while most of their surrounding ranked economies are in the
$4,000 GDP per capita range. As there are high and middle performing regions near the $11,000
GDP per capita range such as Singapore-China, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Hungary, it is
24

important to choose low-performing regions that had similar economic backgrounds as higherperforming regions, but different educational system structures that lead to dissimilar outcomes.
The third and fourth low-performing systems I chose were Indonesia and Peru, which are ranked
as number sixty-three and sixty-five overall for 2012, respectively. Indonesia is chosen as it is
the third worst performing education system in 2012, and Peru as it is the absolute lowest
performing. It was essential that the very best, the very middle, and the very worst are analyzed,
making these two regions a necessary fit. The fifth low-performing education system I chose was
Qatar, which ranks as number sixty-four for 2012 overall PISA score. Qatar has a $93,825 GDP
per capita—the third highest out of all regions analyzed by PISA. Wealth does not always lead to
high outcomes, so it will be interesting to analyze what they are currently doing that calls for
necessary reform.
To continue this research, data is collected for each of the fifteen education systems in
regards to teacher quality, school system structure, curriculum, and educational equality. Much
of my research for each of these categories is completed through the search engine Business
Source Premier, Academic Search Premier, and the OECD database. Education GPS Education
at a Glance 2014: Full selection of indicators as well as Education GPS PISA 2012: Full
selection of indicators is incredibly useful to my research in giving me quantitative findings to
compare each of the fifteen systems. Education GPS Education at a Glance 2014: Full-Selection
of Indicators contains quantitative research findings on each system under the categories of
Educational Outcomes, Participation in Education, Fields of Education, Intergenerational
Mobility, Resources For Education, Teachers, Classroom Environment, Economic and Social
Outcomes, and Adult Competencies. Education GPS PISA 2012: Full selection of indicators
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contains quantitative research findings on each system under the categories of Educational
Outcomes, Student Performance in Mathematics, Student Performance in Reading, Student
Performance in Science, Student Performance in Problem Solving, Financial Literacy,
Participation in Education, Resources for Education, Classroom Environment, Student
Engagement, Drive, and Self-Beliefs, Performance and Socio-Economic Status, Performance and
Diversity, and Governance.
Each category in the Education GPS is sifted through to look for quantitative information
that related to education curriculum, school system structure, education equality, and teacher
quality. For education system structure, comparable data is found on whether the expenditure on
educational institutions as a percentage of GDP is higher or lower than the OECD average. For
education curriculum, data is found on the percentage of teachers and principals that are given
the responsibility of designing course content, the percentage of principals and teachers who are
able to choose which textbooks are used in the classroom, the percentage of teachers and
principals who establish assessment policies, the percentage of principals and teachers who
decide which courses are offered in their schools, whether a national assessment is given at the
upper-secondary and lower-secondary level, and whether compulsory instruction time for
students is above or below the average OECD time.
For teacher quality quantitative data measuring the respect level of teachers in different
countries is found, as well as the ratio of upper secondary teachers’ salaries at the top of scale to
starting scale. For educational equality, the Education GPS gives quantitative information on
student-teacher ratio among students in socio-economically disadvantaged schools versus
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teacher-student ratio among students in socio-economically advantaged schools, percentage of
students in the bottom quarter of the PISA index for economic, cultural, and social status who
perform in the top quarter of students on PISA, percentage of immigrant students in socioeconomically disadvantaged schools, and whether or not the average PISA performances among
students attending schools located in a large city has more than a 10 point difference than
students attending schools in a village or rural area.
Information for the other variables chosen comes from literature in the search engines
Business Search Premier, Academic Search Premier, and the OECD database. For education
system structure, information is collected on whether each system is funded predominantly by a
central government or by a state or local government, whether education goals are determined
predominantly by stage and local governments or a national Ministry of Education, and whether
students are able to enter an academic or vocational secondary track, or strictly academic. For
teacher quality, additional information is collected on the respect level of teaching in society,
whether teachers are recruited from the top-pool of graduates in a country, teaching position
selectivity, whether teachers must graduate from a country’s teacher education system, whether
teachers must hold a teaching certificate, degree requirements for teachers, and professional
development requirements for teachers.
Information for each sub-category under the four main education variables is entered into
a chart comparing each of the fifteen systems. The chart comparing each system’s curriculum is
found as Appendix Figure E. The chart comparing each system’s structure is found as Appendix
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Figure F. The chart comparing each system’s educational equality is found as Appendix Figure
G. The chart comparing each system’s teacher quality is found as Appendix Figure H.
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Findings
Curriculum
Curriculum Variables, or Figure E, is the first chart analyzed in this study. For the
category “principals and teachers report that they have responsibility for the task of determining
course content”, three high-performing countries and two low-performing systems rank above
50% while the rest ranked below 50%. For the high-performing systems, Shanghai ranks at
50.1%, Singapore ranks at 95.5%, Japan ranks at 17.3%, Finland ranks at 45.8% and Canada
ranks at 82.3%. For the middle-performing systems, Portugal ranks 5.9%, the United States ranks
at 15.4%, Luxemburg ranks at 4.8%, Spain ranks at 25.5%, and Hungary ranks at 26.8%. For the
low performing systems, Brazil ranks at 29.6%, Argentina ranks at 23.8%, Indonesia ranks at
73.4%, Qatar ranks at 10.5%, and Peru ranks at 52.7% (OECD Education GPS). Because three
high and two low performing countries both grant high autonomy to teachers and principals to
determine course content, this factor alone does not appear to have a high correlation towards
outcomes–although high-performing systems do appear to have a higher tendency to grant course
content autonomy.
For the category “ principals and teachers report they are given the responsibility of
choosing which textbooks are used in the classroom”, two high-performing, three middleperforming, and one low-performing country rank above 50%, while three high-performing, two
middle-performing, and four low-performing rank below 50%. For the high-performing systems,
Shanghai ranks at 20.7%, Singapore ranks at 26.1%, Japan ranks at 88.8%, Finland ranks at
88.6%, and Canada ranks at 44.2%. For the middle-performing systems, Portugal ranks at 79.2%,
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the United States ranks at 25%, Luxembourg ranks at 17.5%, Spain ranks at 79.7%, and the
United States ranks at 25%. For low-performing systems, Brazil is ranked at 29.6%, Argentina is
ranked at 23.8%, Indonesia is ranked at 73.4%, Qatar is ranked at 10.5%, and Peru is ranked at
52.7% (OECD Education GPS). Textbook autonomy for teachers and principals appears to vary
for each performance category, and does not appear to be correlated with outcomes.
For the category “teachers and principals report that they believe they have considerable
responsibility for establishing assessment policies” only two high-performing countries and three
low-performing countries rank above 50%. Three high-performing, five middle-performing, and
two low-performing systems rank below 50% in this category. For high-performing systems,
Shanghai ranks at 25.4%, Singapore ranks at 16.6%, Japan ranks at 97.7%, Finland ranks at
50.4%, and Canada ranks at 25%. For middle-performing systems, Portugal ranks at 17.7%, the
United States ranks at 15.6%, Luxembourg ranks at 6.2%, Spain ranks at 16.6%, and Hungary
ranks at 34.9%. For low-performing systems, Brazil ranks at 20.3%, Argentina ranks at 59.4%,
Indonesia ranks at 82.1%, Qatar ranks at 5.3%, and Peru ranks at 59.3% (OECD Education
GPS). Because the majority of both high and low performing systems do not give teachers and
principals high responsibility for establishing assessment policies, assessment autonomy does not
seem to have a correlation with outcomes.
For the category “principals and teachers reporting they are given the responsibility of
deciding which courses are offered in their schools”, the majority of high, middle, and low
performing systems give teachers and principals believe they are given course decision
autonomy. Only two high-performing, one middle-performing, and two low-performing systems
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do not. For high-performing systems, Shanghai ranks at 50.1%, Singapore ranks at 95.5%, Japan
ranks at 17.3%, Finland ranks at 45.8%, and Canada ranks at 82.3%. For middle-performing
systems, Portugal ranks at 85%, the United States ranks at 93.6%, Luxembourg ranks at 74.2%,
Spain ranks at 44%, and Hungary ranks at 78.5%. For the low-performing systems, Brazil ranks
at 83.2%, Argentina ranks at 22.3%, Indonesia ranks at 69.0%, Qatar ranks at 82.6%, and Peru
ranks at 40.9% (OECD Education GPS). Because course decisions are granted to the majority of
teachers and principals in all three-performance categories, it does not seem to have a strong
correlation with outcomes.
Out of all five high-performing systems, none of them have a national assessment that is
given to them at the upper-secondary level. For Canada, some schools are given a national
assessment and some are not (OECD Education GPS). Two middle-performing countries give a
national assessment at the upper-secondary level, while three low-performing countries do.
Argentina uses a national assessment sometimes, depending on the school. It appears that
national assessments at the upper-secondary level are more of a trait for middle and lowperforming systems than a trait for high-performing systems.
National Assessments at the lower-secondary level are administered by three highperforming countries, three middle performing countries, and three low-performing countries
(OECD Education GPS). For Canada and Argentina, it again varies depending on the school.
Because national assessments are a trait that many high-performing, middle, and low-performing
systems administer, it does not seem to be a factor that sets a system up for success or failure.
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For the category, “Compulsory instruction time for students”, research is not collected by
the OECD for Shanghai, Singapore, or all five low-performing systems. Out of the remaining
seven systems that do have data available, two high-performing systems and two middle
performing systems have instruction time that was below the OECD average (794 hours a year),
while two high-performing and three middle-performing systems have instruction time that was
above the OECD average (OECD Education GPS). For the high-performing systems, Finland
completes 632 hours, Canada completes 919 hours, and Japan completes 762 hours. For the
middle-performing systems, the United States completes 967 hours, Hungary completes 616
hours, Portugal completes 806 hours, Spain completes 787 hours, and Luxembourg completes
924 hours (OECD Education GPS). Because instruction time is varied throughout each
performance level, there does not appear to be a high-correlation between performance level and
instruction time.
Based off of the findings in the curriculum chart, the only variable that appears to have a
correlation with high-performance is avoiding a national assessment at the upper-secondary
level. However, as Peru also does not administer a national assessment–nor does Portugal and
Luxembourg–the correlation with high-performance does not appear to be particularly strong.
The date collected on curriculum as seen in Figure E leads me to believe that there is not a highcorrelation between educational outcomes and the curriculum sub-categories analyzed in this
study.
Education Structure
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Education Structure, or Figure F, is the second chart analyzed in this study. Only
Singapore and Qatar are found to receive funds predominantly by the central government, while
Shanghai, Canada, Portugal, Spain and Hungary receive funds predominantly by the state or
local government. Japan, Finland, the United States, Luxembourg, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia,
and Peru receive funds by a combination of the central and local government. Analyzing these
systems in their performance level groups, only one high-performing system receives funds by
the central government, as does one low-performing system. Three high-performing systems
receive funds predominantly by the state or local government, as do two middle-performing
systems. Two high-performing systems receive funds by a combination of central and local
government, as does two middle-performing systems, and four low-performing systems. Funding
methods are extremely varied for each performance category and does not appear to have a high
correlation with educational outcomes.
For the category “expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP”, two
high-performing, one-middle performing, and one low-performing system ranks above the
OECD average of 6.1% (OECD Education GPS). Three high-performing, 4 middle-performing,
and four low-performing systems ranks below the OECD average of 6.1%. Shanghai expenditure
on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP ranks at 5.1%, while Singapore ranks at 3.2%,
Japan at 5.1%, Finland at 6.5%, and Canada at 6.8% (OECD Education GPS). Portugal’s
expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP ranks at 5.5%, while the United
States ranks at 6.9%, Luxembourg at 3.2%, Hungary at 4.4%, and Spain at 5.5% (Education
GPS). Brazil’s expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP ranks at 5.9%,
while Argentina ranks at 7.2%, Indonesia at 3.6%, Qatar at 4.1%, and Peru at 2.8% (OECD
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Education GPS). Level of funding does not appear to have a correlation with performance
outcomes, as two high-performing, one middle-performing system and one low-performing
system spend a higher percentage of GDP on educational institutions than other education
systems. Shanghai, Singapore, and Portugal spend below the OECD average for percentage of
GDP invested in educational institutions and still maintain top-outcomes.
One high-performing, two middle-performing, and one low-performing system has its
education goals determined predominantly by the state or local government, while four highperforming, three middle-performing, and four low-performing systems has a national set of
education goals determined by a Ministry of Education. Systems with education goals
determined predominantly by the state or local government include Canada, Spain, Hungary, and
Indonesia. Systems with national education goals include Shanghai, Singapore, Japan, Finland,
Portugal, United States, Luxembourg, Brazil, Argentina, Qatar, and Peru. The majority of high,
middle, and low-performing systems each have a national set of education goals—so this itself
does not seem to have a high correlation with educational outcomes. It appears that sometimes a
national standard works well, while sometimes it does not.
All fifteen systems that are analyzed for this study have the majority of students enrolled
in government or public schools instead of independent private schools. Having the majority of
students enrolled in public schools does not appear to set other system’s performance above or
below one another.
Four high-performing, two middle-performing, and four low-performing systems have
both academic and vocational secondary school tracks, while one high-performing, three-middle
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performing, and one low-performing system do not. Shanghai, Singapore, Japan, Finland,
Portugal, Hungary, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, and Qatar have both academic and secondary
tracks while Canada, United States, Luxembourg, and Peru only offer an academic secondary
track. While the majority of high-performing systems offer both academic and vocational tracks,
so do the majority of low-performing systems. Tracking option choices do not appear to indicate
educational outcomes. The date collected on curriculum as seen in Figure G leads me to believe
that there is not a high-correlation between educational outcomes and any of the education
structure sub-categories analyzed in this study.
Education Equality
Education equality, or Figure G, is the next chart analyzed for this study. It is found that
the student-teacher ratio among students in socio-economically disadvantaged schools is higher
than the student-teacher ratio among students in socio-economically advantaged schools in only
one high-performing system. The student-teacher ratio is also higher for disadvantaged schools
in two-middle performing systems, and two low-performing systems. The student teacher-ratio
among students in socio-economically disadvantaged schools is lower than the ratio among
students in socio-economically advantaged schools in four high-performing systems, three
middle-performing systems, and three low-performing systems. Shanghai has a 10.51 studentteacher ratio in economically advanced schools versus a 14.68 student-teacher ratio in
economically disadvantaged schools. Singapore has a 15.94 student-teacher ratio in advanced
schools, compared with a 14.02 ratio in disadvantaged schools. Japan has a 13.03 student-teacher
ratio in advantaged schools, versus a 9.96 Finland has a 11.44 student-teacher ratio in
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advantaged schools, compared with a 9.19 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged schools.
Canada has a 16.93 student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools versus a 14.71 student-teacher
ratio in disadvantaged schools (OECD Education GPS). Portugal has a 10.45 student-teacher
ratio in advantaged schools, compared with a 7.80 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged
schools. The United States has a 18.48 student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools compared to a
16.77 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged schools. Luxembourg has a 9.28 student-teacher
ratio in advantaged schools, versus a 9.00 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged schools. Spain
has a 14.66 student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools compared with a 11.68 student-teacher
ratio in disadvantaged schools. Hungary has a 10.45 student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools,
versus a 13.42 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged schools (OECD Education GPS). Brazil
has a 22.93 student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools, compared with a 31.27 student-teacher
ratio in disadvantaged schools. Argentina has a 11.27 student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools
versus a 9.55 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged schools. Indonesia has a 16.72 studentteacher ratio in advantaged schools, versus a 17.92 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged
schools. Qatar has a 16.00 student-teacher in advantaged schools, versus a 12.48 student-teacher
ratio in disadvantaged schools. Peru has a 20.13 student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools
versus a 17.01 student-teacher ratio in disadvantaged schools (Education GPS). It appears that
having a higher student-teacher ratio in advantaged schools than in disadvantaged schools is
more of a common characteristic for higher-performing systems. However three low-performing
systems also have a higher student-teacher ratio in their advantaged schools than they have in
their disadvantaged schools. While this trait is one that is more common in high-performing
systems, it does not appear to have a high-correlation with outcomes.
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For the category “percentage of students in the bottom-quarter of PISA index for
economic, cultural, and social status who perform in the top-quarter of students on PISA”, all
five high-performing systems rank above the OECD average of 6.38%. Only one middleperforming system, Spain, also ranks above the OECD average. The remaining middle-and lowperforming systems rank below the OECD average of 6.38%. For the high-performing systems,
Shanghai ranks at 19.20%, Singapore ranks at 15.06%, Japan ranked at 11.29%, Finland ranks at
8.13%, and Canada ranks at 8.30% (OECD Education GPS). For the middle-performing systems,
Portugal ranks at 7.68%, the United States ranks at 5.17%, Luxembourg ranks at 6.10%, Spain
ranks at 6.40%, and Hungary ranks at 4.08% (OECD Education GPS). For the low-performing
systems, Brazil ranks at 1.75%, Argentina ranks at 1.06%, Indonesia ranks at 2.55%, Qatar ranks
at 0.44%, and Peru ranks at 0.52% (OECD Education GPS). There is a very strong correlation
between a system’s education performance and disadvantaged student performance. It appears
that the more often students from low-economic, cultural, and economic status are able to
perform exceedingly well on the PISA test, the higher the educational outcomes for the system as
a whole. Performance results of students in low socio-economic status seem to be the first highcorrelation towards educational outcomes.
For the category “percentage of immigrant students in socio-economically disadvantaged
schools”, Canada is the only high-performing system that ranks above the 6.38% OECD average
(OECD Education GPS). Two middle-performing systems and one low-performing system also
rank above the OECD average. Four high-performing, three middle-performing, and four lowperforming systems rank below the OECD average. Shanghai only has 2% of their immigrant
students in socio-economically disadvantaged schools, while Singapore has 15%, Japan has
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0.5%, Finland has 4.8%, and Canada has 38.9% (OECD Education GPS). Out of the middleperforming systems, Portugal ranks at 6.7%, the United States ranks 40%, Luxembourg ranks at
58%, Spain ranks at 13.3%, and Hungary ranks at 0.6% (OECD Education GPS). For the lowperforming systems, Brazil ranks at 0.5%, Argentina ranks at 6.6%, Indonesia ranks at .1%,
Qatar ranks at 52.4%, and Peru ranks at .7% (OECD Education GPS). The amount of immigrants
in disadvantaged schools is substantially varied throughout the three performance levels, and
does not appear to have a high-correlation towards educational outcomes (OECD Education
GPS).
The date collection on educational equity as seen in Figure H leads me to believe that
there is a high-correlation between educational outcomes and the performance results of students
in low socio-economic status. What now needs to be discussed in greater depth is what highperforming systems specifically seem to do to ensure top-outcomes from their low-socio
economic students in comparison with the middle-and low-performing systems. In order for
middle and low-performing systems to improve results for their low socio-economic status
students, we must analyze what works with the top-performing systems, versus what seems to be
less effective.
Education of students in low socio-economic status
An important aspect of Shanghai’s education system is the ability of teachers to handle
teaching children of diverse backgrounds and abilities (OECD, 2012b). As diversity and
disparity in schools are typical features of Shanghai schools, they work to ensure equal
opportunity between students (OECD, 2012b). In the 1980s migrant workers came from rural
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villages to more urban areas. Some work on construction sites while others are low-wage
laborers (OECD, 2012b). Because of Shanghai’s active commercial economies, Shanghai has a
huge population of migrant children. In 2006 21.4 % of migrant children were school age
(OECD, 2012b). The OECD states that Shanghai has developed the notion that “migrant children
are our children” and work to include them equally in their educational development (OECD,
2012b). The former Deputy Director of Shanghai Academy of Education Research states,
“Shanghai has historically always been a city of migrants. Children of the migrants today will
stay on and become bonafide citizens of Shanghai. How they are treated today will determine
how they feel towards and contribute to the future of Shanghai (OECD, 2012b).
In Singapore, the general belief is that it is an education system’s duty to nurture every
child regardless of their achievement level or ability (OECD, 2012c). Housing and schools are
deliberately ethnically mixed in Singapore to combat racial discrimination (OECD, 2012c). An
important goal for Singapore has been to make sure that ethnic and religious rivalries do not exist
that hinder the development of their society as a whole (OECD, 2012c). It was decided that
schools would be the gateway to ensuring all students were given the tools they needed to
succeed regardless of their socioeconomic status (OECD, 2012c). Singapore achieves this by
ensuring that every school has a share of the best teachers, and specifically gives these teachers
to struggling students (OECD, 2012c). Another important aspect of educational equality in
Singapore is the focus that is given to lower-level achievers (OECD, 2012c). They embrace that
students can sometimes be “late bloomers” and allow their students to move horizontally
between secondary level education streams (OECD, 2012c).
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The belief in Japan is that all teachers can learn to the highest standards. They do not give
in to a diluted curriculum, to ensure students are achieving at the highest levels (OECD, 2011c).
Classes in Japan are heterogeneous—they are not any students that are held back in easier classes
or given higher-level classes based off of their perceived ability (OECD, 2011c). Their system is
designed in such a way to “achieve the greatest good for the greatest number” (OECD, 2011c).
By keeping all students in the same class level, high-achieving students are able to assist lowerachieving students within the classroom (OECD, 2011c). Research shows that this helps both the
tutee and the tutor, as the tutor learns nearly as much by simply engaging in the tutoring process
itself (OECD, 2011c). Prefectures also reassign Japanese teachers and principals to different
schools to make sure that there is an even distribution of the highest-performing teachers
(OECD, 2011c). Transfers are administered every few years to make sure that the same people
are not in the same school all the time (OECD, 2011c).
According to the OECD, “equality in educational opportunities lies at the heart of
Finland's education policy (OECD, 2014a). The goal is for all children to have a neighborhood
school that sufficiently serves the needs of that student. Regardless, parents are still able to
choose any school they would like their child to attend in their own municipality (OECD,
2014a). Students in Finland are brought into the same schools coming from very different life
circumstances and life goals. Finland’s equal opportunity principle insists that all students must
be given equal chances in school for success (OECD, 2014a). Student welfare teams are also
formed at each school and meet twice a month to discuss the well-being of specific children in
their school (OECD, 2014a). Teachers achieve equality under a peruksoulu method, in which
they believe that schools should function as small-scale democracies, and that all children are
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capable of learning if given the proper support (OECD, 2014a). Teachers design learning
environments that enables pupils to have differentiated learning to meet their individual needs
(OECD, 2014a).
In Canada, a focus on educational equity is also key. The federal government is
responsible for funding and encouraging the education of the indigenous people of Canada (Top
Performing Countries). They have made it their mission to establish education in the official
minority language in each province to ensure equal educational opportunity is given to
indigenous people (Top Performing Countries). Canada also works on identifying potential
dropouts and provides early intervention and help they need to be successful. With drop-out
intervention and a concentration on low-performing students, high school graduation rates went
from 68% in 2003 to 82% in 2013 (Top Performing Countries). From PISA 2012, variation in
math performance as explained by socioeconomic background was 9.4%, in comparison with a
14.8% OECD average (Top Performing Countries).
The number of immigrants in Portugal has increased dramatically, contributing to their
educational inequality (Santiago, 2012). In 2009, upper-secondary graduation rates were 63% ,
with the rest of students leaving the school system with low skills (Santiago,2012). A large
percentage of the population has a low-appreciation for educational attainment that likely result
from their parents’ own low educational attainment and unskilled-jobs that are available
(Santiago,2012). Special attention to immigrant and low-socio economic students does not
appear present.
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Low socio-economic status in the United States has a higher correlation to poor
educational performance than most other countries (OECD, 2011d). Many tend to believe that
the reason the United States is not a top-education performer is because the U.S. is so diverse
socio-economically or demographically. The OECD states that “many countries with equal or
higher proportions of immigrant students and non-native speakers of local language are
outperforming the United States and show a more moderate relationship between socio economic
background and learning outcomes” (OECD,2011d). The only OECD countries where socioeconomic background shows a greater impact on reading performance than the United States is
Hungary, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Chile, and Turkey (OECD,2011d). In the United
States, the highest-quality teachers are often absent from low-income schools. Low socioeconomic neighborhoods very often end up feed into low-performing schools with a low-quality
teaching force. A general belief that all children are capable of achieving at the highest-levels is
not often present in America.
Luxembourg has a very large education gap plaguing its education system. On the 2012
PISA test, advantaged Luxembourgish students outperformed least-advantaged students by 115
score points (Shewbridge, 2012). Fundamental education is taught in German while French is
gradually introduced into secondary education, which poses as an extra obstacle to students who
are from an immigrant background (Shewbridge, 2012). Luxembourg also has a highly stratified
system. In the 2009-2010 school year, 81.4% of the secondary general education track was made
up of native Luxembourgish, where natives only made up 57.5% of secondary technical
education (Shewbridge,2012). The stratified system between students of high and low socioeconomic status contributes greatly to students’ success and performance (Shewbridge,2012).
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High divergences in test scores are very present among different regions in Spain
(Agasisti, 2013). It is cited that education differences has a high impact on economic inequality
at regional levels (Agasisti, 2013). Some students from Spanish regions actually perform just as
well as students from education systems ranking at the top of PISA assessments, but the vast
inequality in schools that exists pulls Spain education ranking down (Agasisti, 2013).
Hungary deals with a large educational equality gap between Roma and non-Roma
students. The Romani people are one of the largest and poorest ethnic minority groups in Europe
and compromise between 10 and 12 percent of the adolescent population in Hungary (MolnarStadler, 2002). Throughout history, the lives of the Roma have been branded by exclusion
(Molnar-Stadler, 2002). It is believed that the gap between the Roma and non-Roma students is
due to differences in health, parenting, and schools (Molnar-Stadler, 2002). It does not appear
that measures are taken to give Romani students the support they may need (Molnar-Stadler,
2002).
In Brazil, education is typically made up of free, public low-quality education, or private
higher-quality education (Belluzzo & Pazello, 2013). Students are only able to enroll in private
schools if their family is able to pay the tuition fees (Belluza & Pazello, 2013). Often, the ability
to receive a higher-quality education in Brazil is based off of income (Belluza & Pazello, 2013).
The parents of students in low-performing public schools have received little education
themselves-often less than four years of schooling themselves (Beluza & Pazello, 2013). By
having low-income students enroll in low-income schools, a large education gap continues to
exist in Brazil.
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Very little specific education gap information exists regarding Argentina or Qatar. But
research conducted by the OECD that only 1.06% of low socio-economic students in Argentina
and 2.55% percentage of low socio-economic students in Qatar perform at the top of their
systems PISA scores indicate that the gap does exist (OECD Education GPS). 52.4% of
immigrant students in Qatar are also placed in disadvantaged schools (OECD Education GPS).
In Indonesia, social and geographical disparities are high and seem to be increasing (Stein
& Pratikno, 2006). Differences in education investment in rural and urban areas have become
extremely prominent through decentralization, forcing many students from poor and rural
families to deal with poor educational quality (Stein & Pratikno, 2006). In many sub-districts of
Indonesia, model schools are being built, causing a sharp contrast between the new schools and
neighboring worn down ones (Stein & Pratikno, 2006). Tuition fees are extremely high for the
model schools, creating educational dominance of the elite (Stein & Pratikno, 2006). As one
Indonesia school principal expressed, “Don’t you ever think that the education sector is free from
corruption” (Stein & Pratikno, 2006). The cost of education for children of rural and poor
families is often too much for families to handle (Stein & Pratikno, 2006). Out of the poorest
half of households, school costs can make-up up to 40% of total family expenditures (Stein &
Pratikno, 2006).
There is a huge grade repetition and drop-out rate among indigenous children in Peru
(Ames). A very low-quality of educational inputs are offered to indigenous children in schools
(Ames). Schools serving indigenous children in Peru often have inadequate infrastructure, a lack
of equipment and educational materials, as well as other resources (Ames). Educational
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assessment results among indigenous children are extremely low. At the primary level, only 6
percent of indigenous Quechua children perform at grade level for reading comprehension, and
only 19.2% in math (Ames). It appears that disadvantages given to ingenious children are
incredibly deepened without the ability to take classes in their own language, without their own
culture being taken into account in the classroom, and without access to schools of high-quality
(Ames).
Teacher Quality
Teacher Quality, or Figure H, is the last chart analyzed for this study. All five-high
performing systems fall into the category “teachers are recruited from the top pool of graduates.”
None of the middle or low performing systems fall into this category. Shanghai, Singapore,
Japan, Finland, and Canada are all repeatedly cited for recruiting from the top cohort of their
graduating classes, while none of the middle or low performing systems are cited as holding the
same high-level of qualifications for their teaching force. In Shanghai, education programs are
able to recruit from the top pool of graduates because teaching has moved up as a preferred
occupation (OECD, 2012b). Because universities allow priority admission to teacher candidates,
teacher programs often have the first choice of the best students. Teachers have a more stable
income than many other professions, making it a top choice for great students (OECD, 2012b).
Similarly, in Singapore, prospective teachers are selected from the top one-third of the secondary
graduating class by panels of school officials (OECD, 2012c). Japan recruits top students as well,
as teaching is seen as a highly desirable job (OECD, 2011c). Only the best and brightest are able
to become teaching professionals in Finland (OECD, 2014a). In 2011 the University of Helsinki
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received 2,300 applications for 120 spots in their primary teacher education programme (OECD,
2014a). Teacher quality in Canada too begins by selecting from a top cohort of individuals. The
majority of prospective teachers are drawn from the top 30% of their college peers (Top
Performing Countries).
In Portugal, it does not appear that they set qualifications that ensures top-students enter
the field of teaching. In the United States, students often see teaching as more if a blue-collar
based occupation rather than a knowledge-based profession, often deterring top graduates from
pursuing a job in teaching (OECD, 2011d). Research shows that in 2000 the likelihood of a
teacher having been among the highest scoring ten percent of high school students in the United
States was only at 11 percent (Portuguesa, 2000). No qualifications are found for Luxembourg,
Spain, and Hungary that ensure they recruit the most talented cohort of students into their
education programs, either. Brazil, like many systems, has difficulty recruiting top-graduates into
the field of teaching because of low-teacher pay level. In Maranhao, Brazil, many primaryschool teachers must find a second job to earn a living. Less-skilled, higher paying jobs are
common in the region, making teaching a less attractive profession (Principles, Aims and
Objectives). No qualifications are found for Argentina, Indonesia, Qatar, and Peru that ensure
they have top-graduating students entering the field of teaching. In addition, teacher shortages
are a common problem in the low and middle performing systems studied, creating a system that
strives to get teachers into the classroom to fill vacancies regardless of their education and
background. Specific quantitative data does not exist for the middle and low performing systems
stating what percentage of top-performing students enter the field of teaching. However, it is a
reasonable assumption that without specific controls to manage an outcome, those outcomes
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typically fall into a normal distribution. Without specific goals and measures in place explicitly
targeting that a system recruits teachers from a top-cohort of graduates, it is highly unlikely that
they achieve it. Based off of findings with Shanghai, Singapore, Japan, Finland, and Canada,
ensuring the teaching force is recruited from the top pool of graduates appears to have a highcorrelation with high-performance outcomes.
All five-high performing systems also fall into the category “teaching is considered a
highly respected position in society.” None of the middle or low performing systems fall into this
category. The OECD measured the percentage of teachers from various systems who believe that
the teaching profession is valued in society, with the average being 25.2% (OECD Education
GPS). Shanghai and Canada were not measured by the OECD for this study, but Singapore,
Finland, and Japan all ranked above the OECD average. 67.6% of teachers in Singapore believe
that the teaching profession is valued in society, as does 58.6% of Finland teachers and 28.1% of
Japanese teachers (OECD Education GPS). In regular opinion polls given to young Finnish
students, teaching consistently ranks as the most admired profession (OECD, 2014a). Although
Japan ranks above the OECD average, the percentage may still seem low compared to other topsystems. It is reasonable to guess that teachers themselves may view themselves differently than
society as a whole. According to the OECD, as Confucian tradition, great honor is given to the
teacher (OECD, 2011c). Since the modern area began schools have been staffed with members
of the upper class, making teaching a desirable occupation in Japan (OECD, 2011c). It is
considered a great honor to be a teacher in Singapore as it is seen as a competitive and wellregarded occupation (OECD, 2012d). Shanghai and Canada are repeatedly cited for the highlevel of teacher respect in society, as is seen in literature analyzed for this study. In Shanghai,
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teaching is a highly-respected position because top graduates make up the teaching force. The
qualifications to become a teacher are high and include a steady income, so the career is held to a
high regard (OECD, 2012c). Canada shares these same beliefs about teachers. Because teacher
education programs are thought to be academically rigorous, society holds great-respect for the
profession (Top Performing Countries).
The OECD measured the teacher-respect level of two of the middle-performing systems
analyzed in this study– Portugal ranks at 10.5%, while Spain ranks at 8.5% (OECD Education
GPS). Literature that is studied for this research appears to point in the direction that teacherrespect level is not high in the United States, Hungary, or Luxembourg. The United States seems
to have a low-respect level for teaching because society perceives it as an easy occupation to get
into. Because of its perceived easiness, there seems to be a general notion that teachers could not
get into more demanding occupations (OECD, 201d). There is not any scholarly research
available that cites Luxembourg’s teacher-respect level being particularly strong. In Hungary,
teacher respect-level is cited as being low due to the low financial earnings (Dobos &
Vasarhelyi, 2011). This causes many teachers to leave the profession (Dobos & Vasarhelvi,
2011). The OECD only measured the teacher-respect level of one of my low-performing
systems. Teacher-respect level in Brazil ranks at 12.6% (OECD Education GPS). There is not
scholarly research that points to the direction that the respect-level held by teachers in Argentina,
Peru, Indonesia, and Qatar is high either. Qualification, responsibility, and experience often
separate occupations with low-level of prestige from occupations with high levels of prestige. If
high-qualifications are not present, a high-level of respect is unlikely to be present as well. Based
on data regarding Shanghai, Singapore, Japan, Finland, and Canada, it appears that the level of
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respect held in society for teaching appears also have a high-correlation with educational
performance.
The next category for teacher quality is whether or not receiving a teaching position is a
highly-selective process. Receiving a teaching position is highly-selective for all five-top
performing systems analyzed in this study. In Shanghai, prospective teachers must take rigorous
examinations in the areas of pedagogy, psychology, teaching ability, and teaching methods to
ensure that they pass the necessary qualifications to be a successful educator (Top Performing
Countries). The high-level of students recruited mixed with the rigorous teacher testing makes
for a selective process. Becoming a teacher in Singapore is highly selective as well—students
complete an education program that ensures a strong pocus on pedagogical content and synergies
among modules within the program (OECD, 2012c). Strong selectivity of teachers in Singapore
begins from the initial recruitment. Because student admittance into teacher education program is
so selective, students receive perks while undergoing their education. Prospective teachers
receive a monthly stipend competitive with the monthly salary for graduates of other fields to
ensure the highly-selected students wish to complete the program (OECD, 2012c). Japan is
highly selective as well. Because teaching is held to such a high regard, they receive numerous
applicants. For every teaching position held in Japan, there are seven applicants (OECD, 2012c).
Becoming a teacher in Finland is a competitive and selective process. After passing a rigorous
national Matriculation exam, successful candidates have to not only have the best scores, but
prove themselves to have the best interpersonal skills (OECD, 2014a). Every year, about one out
of every ten applicants will be accepted to study to become a teacher in a Finnish primary school.
Around 5,000 teachers are selected each year among 20,000 applicants (OECD, 2014a).
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Canadian teacher education programs are also highly-selective, as is stated by the Center On
International Education Benchmarking (Top Performing Countries).
Receiving a teaching position is not seen as a highly-selective process for any of the
middle and low-performing systems analyzed. In Portugal, there are not any specific policies for
access to teacher education programmes. Training institutions are then given the responsibility of
setting admittance requirements (Portuguesa, 2000). There is not any literature that cites their
training programs as particularly selective or competitive. In the United States, education
programs do not have a reputation of being particularly difficult to be admitted into. As the
OECD discusses, the bar has not yet been set that detours students with poor qualifications from
entering education programs in the United States (OECD, 2011d). Luxembourg uses a system
known as “open recruitment” to select teachers for schools (Key Data on Teachers and School
Leaders in Europe). During open recruitment, teachers seeking employment are matched with
available teaching posts (Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). It is not cited as
a competitive or selective. Competitive examinations are given for prospective teachers at the
secondary level however, which includes an examination phase assessing mastery of teaching
techniques, merit-based selection phase assessing, suitability of candidate based on education
background and teaching experience, and a probationary period in which candidates demonstrate
their teaching aptitude (Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). Although this
system is seen as competitive, it is not cited as being selective. Spain organizes the same system
of competitive examinations as well (Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). The
state regulates basic requirements for students entering the teaching profession, but the
individual communities are in charge of organizing their own merit-based selection and
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competitive examinations to fit their own standards (Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders
in Europe). Again, although this is a competitive process, it is not cited as having high standards
to meet qualifications. Teacher shortages are cited to be a problem in Hungary, so it does not
appear that they can afford to be highly-selective with their prospective teachers.
Brazil does not have a high-level teacher selectivity process, either. It is cited that in
Maranhoe, there are 50,000 primary-school teachers that are lacking degrees. It is believed that
this is beyond the capabilities of the three local universities to control or fix (Luis, 2000). In
Argentina, teachers are trained in a variety of different capacities included provincial, technical,
and private institutions and universities (Argentina-Teaching Profession). Even so, many
teachers in the classroom have not been through a teacher-training school, confirming that they
are not currently being highly-selective with their teacher choices. Qualified teachers are often in
high-demand in Argentina, especially in remote regions (Argentina-Teaching Profession).
Indonesia teachers are required to have a bachelor’s degree and teacher certification based
Teacher Law 2005, but because they have been working to ensure all teachers meet minimum
credentials, their process does not appear to be competitive or selective (Supriatna). In Qatar, the
Supreme Education Council reports that up to 31 percent of teachers in the Gulf State have no
formal qualifications, therefor having a low-selective process (Ferris-Lay, 2011). While it
appears that Peru has a large number of qualified teachers of higher institutes of pedagogy or
universities, there is not any literature that indicates the process to receive a teaching position is a
selective procedure (Education in Peru: History, Current Systems, and Equity).
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It appears that most middle and low-performing systems are placing a higher emphasis
on ensuring they can get teachers who meet teacher certification laws into their classroom, rather
than focusing on further selection measures beyond certification. Middle and low-performing
systems are working to fill vacancies, rather than filling their schools with teachers that have met
highly-selective measures. Based off of this contrast from Shanghai, Singapore, Japan, Finland,
and Canada, it appears that the selectivity-level of teaching positions is a high-indicator of
educational outcomes.
Whether or not prospective teachers must graduate from a country’s teacher education
program is the next category analyzed. All five high-performing systems require all prospective
teachers to graduate from a country’s teacher-education program, as do two middle-performing
systems and one low-performing system. The remaining three middle-performing and four lowperforming systems do not require all prospective teachers to graduate from a teacher education
program. In Shanghai, in-service College of Education was merged into normal universities with
sub degree diploma earnings necessary for primary schools and degree earnings necessary for
secondary schools. In Singapore, all teachers receive their training at the National Institute of
Education at Nanyang Technological University (NIE) (OECD, 2012c). Depending on their level
of education when they enter, they may choose to take either a diploma or a degree course. All
new teachers are mentored for the first few years by the NIE (OECD, 2012c). Japanese students
have to attend a ministry-certified teacher education programme at a junior college or university
to become a teacher (OECD, 2011c). National teacher training universities with model schools
attached to them also exist to give teacher training to next teachers (OECD, 2011c). An induction
programme also exists that gives students the opportunity to work for a year with a master
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teacher before teaching full-time on their own. Master teachers are given a year off from their
teaching jobs to supervise the new prospective teachers (OECD, 2011c). In Finland, teacher
training programs are structured in such a way that people work autonomously and rely on
scientific knowledge and skills gained in universities to guide their teaching practices (OECD,
2014a). Primary-grade teachers major in education and also minor in at least two subjects that
are taught in a primary school curriculum. Upper-grade teachers major in the subject they will be
teaching, and complete a fifth year focused on education practice. Teacher candidates are also
expected to write a research-based dissertation as their final requirement for their master’s
degree that shows a holistic view of the learning process and teaching (OECD, 2014a). Finland
education programs also have a major clinical component where students practice teaching skills
in front of their peers and in Teacher Training Schools run by the universities (OECD, 2014a).
Practice teaching is one-third of the curriculum for Finnish education programs (OECD, 2014a).
Teacher training programs for Canada are run by Canadian universities. Their training program
includes completing a bachelor’s of education degree, or a bachelor’s with additional education
certification (Top Performing Countries ).
In Portugal, teachers acquire professional qualifications through higher education
programs and graduate with a Licenciatura degree. The curriculum is meant to promote learning
of different functions needed to meet the demands of a teaching career, ensure integration of
pedagogical features into practical components, and enhance critical analysis and pedagogical
innovation (Portuguesa, 2000). However, there are many teachers in the classroom who have not
gone through a teacher higher-education program or have obtained a teaching certificate
(Portuguesa, 2000). Not all teachers in the United States have received a bachelor’s degree in
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education. In fact studies have shown that more-selective universities have actually become less
likely to offer undergraduate education programs that allows students to earn their teacher
certification in four years (Teach.org). The percentage of students who have earned bachelor’s
degrees dropped from ten percent in 1990 to six percent in 2010 (Wei, Darling-Hammond).
Luxembourg’s education programs are run through a European consecutive model in which
teachers begin their education program after or close to the end of their degree. General initial
teacher education courses are taken abroad because these programs are not offered in
Luxembourg itself (Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). There are many
teachers in Luxembourg who have not earned an education degree. Spain also practices under the
consecutive model (Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). It does not appear that
there are other alternative routes to become a teacher in Spain beyond completing a degree
through the consecutive model. Hungary practices under the consecutive model as well (Key
Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). There does not appear to be any evidence that
Hungarian teachers can become teachers beyond the consecutive model route.
Brazil has teacher training that is implemented in different modes, partially in
intermediate schools and partially in higher education (Principles, Aims and Objectives).
Intermediate school training has three year courses with an additional year of studies that
qualifies teachers to work in the fifth and six grades of fundamental school, along with other
specializations (Principles, Aims and Objectives). Higher education trains teachers for
fundamental and intermediate schools, as well as special education and preschool courses
(Principles, Aims and Objectives). However, teachers who do not meet the minimum
requirements for completing these programs are offered opportunities for professional training
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(Principles, Aims and Objectives). Not all teachers in Brazil graduate from the intermediate
school or higher education programs. In Argentina, teacher training for the secondary level is
completed in normal schools. By completing a five-year normal school prospective teachers are
able to earn a teaching certificate and permission to teach in a primary school or provincial
school if the certificate is approved by the local authorities. An extra four-year requirement is set
in place for secondary teacher-training schools, as well as an extra two years for teaching
kindergarten (Argentina-Teaching Profession). Although additional measures are set in place for
secondary and kindergarten teachers, teachers for most grade levels are not required to enroll in
an education program. In Indonesia teachers must hold a bachelor’s degree and earn a teaching
certificate, but they do not have to graduate from a teacher education program to teach
(Supriatna). Qatar teachers are not required to graduate from a teacher education program to
enter the classroom, as more than 30 percent of school teachers are unqualified to teach (FerrisLay, 2011). In Peru teachers are required to enter either a pedagogical institution or a university
education program. The pedagogical institutions tend to provide a consistent program of
instruction from institution to institution, while the university education varies (Ferris ). The
pedagogical institutes are often a good substitute for university admissions and are usually more
accessible than taking the academic university track (Education in Peru: History, Currently
System, and Equity). The focus in institutes is more on content competencies than on teaching
methodologies (Education in Peru: History, Current System, and Equity).
Whether or not a system requires prospective teachers to graduate from a country’s
teacher education program seems to be slightly correlated with educational outcomes. It appears
that while all high-performing systems require teachers to graduate from a teacher education
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program, a few middle and low performing systems require this as well. While teacher training
programs seem to be a step in the right direction, they do not always seem to deliver teachers
with high outcomes.
The next category analyzed is whether or not all teachers are required to hold a teachingcertificate to teach. All five high-performing systems require teachers to hold a teachingcertificate to teach, as do two middle-performing and four low-performing systems. Shanghai,
Singapore, Japan, Finland, Canada require teaching certificates, as does Spain, Hungary,
Indonesia, Qatar, and Peru. In Shanghai, all primary school teachers must hold a sub-degree
diploma and all teachers in secondary schools must hold professional certification. Singapore
teachers also receive certification through their diploma or degree course (OECD, 2012c).
Japanese teachers gain their teacher certification from ministry-certified teacher education
programmes or teacher training universities (OECD, 2011c). Finnish teachers are required to
become certified, and do not earn their certification until they have earned a master’s degree
(OECD, 2014a). Canada also requires teacher certification. Typically students earn a bachelor’s
degree in education or a bachelor’s degree with an additional education certification. Following
the initial education, most provinces require another examination or certification process (Top
Performing Countries).
In Portugal, teachers receive a diploma certifying specific professional qualifications
after completing the licenciatura programmes (Portuguesa, 2000). However, a large percentage
of school teachers in Portugal do not hold professional qualification (Portuguesa, 2000). In the
United States, students receive a teaching certificate after graduating with a bachelor’s in
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education. Earning an alternative teaching certificate is also possible for students who did not
graduate with a bachelor’s degree in education. However, states have many exceptions to having
teachers even hold an alternative certification. For example, in Tennessee permission is granted
to local school systems to employee an individual without a valid license when a school system
is unable to obtain services of a qualified teacher for a vacant position (Teach.org). A “waiver”
can also be granted to fully-licensed teachers who teach three or more classes a day outside of
their licensed endorsement (Teach.org). Interim B Licenses are also made available to candidates
who have met program requirements for certification, but cannot obtain passing scores on Praxis
II exams. This license can be renewed once with no questions asked, while the second renewal
requires verification of a “handicapping” condition (Teach.org). In Luxembourg, teachers can
obtain a permanent contract without going through a teacher education program or earning a
teaching certificate by undertaking in an employment-based training of 60 hours (Key Data on
Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). It appears that teachers in Spain and Hungary are
required to obtain a teaching certificate through their teacher education program. However,
Hungary deals with major teacher shortages and inadequacy; especially in science and
mathematics (Dobos, Ocsko & Vasarhelyi, 2001).
In Brazil, only about half of teachers in the public school system have a higher-education
teacher qualification (Principles, Aims and Objectives). Teaching certificates are required for
Argentina teachers and given after completion of a five-year normal school. While all five highperforming systems require teaching certificates, so do two middle-performing systems, and
three low-performing systems. While it seems odd that three low-performing systems require
teaching certificates for all teachers while only two middle-performing systems do, it is possible
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that some systems may be less transparent online and in scholarly resources about their
certification exceptions. Regardless, this data seems to indicate that while teaching certificates
are traits all high-performing systems possess, a certificate on its own does not seem to be
correlated with outcomes.
The next category for teacher quality that is studied is whether teachers are required to
hold a post-secondary degree to teach. All five high and middle performing systems require
teachers to hold a post-secondary degree, as does one low-performing system. These systems
include Shanghai, Singapore, Japan, Finland, Canada, Portugal, United States, Luxembourg,
Spain, Hungary, and Indonesia. One exception is Shanghai primary school teachers, who may
enroll in teacher education school immediately following junior secondary school (Top
Performing Systems). Japan also has one other exception. Prospective teachers who have
completed college at a junior college teaching program are also able to hold a temporary
certification that is valid for fifteen years in Japan (Top Performing Systems). The majority of
Japanese teachers however, do hold a bachelor’s degree (Top Performing Systems). It appears
that ensuring most teachers hold a post-secondary degree is a common trait of high or middle
performance levels, but it is not a trait that is correlated with success on its own.
Whether or not teachers must hold a master’s degree to teach is the next category
analyzed. Finland is the only system that requires teachers to hold a master’s degree to teach.
While requiring teachers to hold a master’s degree is a high-standard of Finland that likely
contributes to their high-performance level, it is not a requirement that all systems use to ensure
their high outcomes.
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Whether the ratio of upper-secondary teacher’s salaries at the top-of-scale to starting
salary is above or below the OECD average is analyzed next. The OECD average ratio is 1.62
(OECD Education GPS). This information is used as a category for study instead of salary
amount, as cost-of-living varies so much from region to region. Salary-growth over time would
offer a more accurate comparison. The OECD only measured the salary ratio for three of the topperforming systems that are analyzed in this study, and three of the middle-performing systems.
However it is important to see if a pattern still emerges between the systems that had salary data
available. One high-performing and two- middle performing system has a ratio that is above the
OECD average, while two high-performing and one middle-performing has a salary ratio that is
below the OECD average. Japan has a ratio of 2.26, while Finland has a ratio of 1.32 and Canada
a ratio of 1.57 (OECD Education GPS). Portugal has a salary-ratio of 1.66, while the United
States has a ratio of 1.48 and Hungary has a ratio of 1.88 (OECD Education GPS). From the data
available, it appears that teacher salary-growth over time does not have a high-correlation with
educational performance.
The last category that is used for analysis is whether or not teachers are required to
complete extensive professional development as teachers. All top-performing systems require
extensive professional development, as do three middle-performing systems. However, the
amount of professional development the high-performing systems display still far exceeds the
extensive development required for the three middle-performing systems. Systems that require
extensive professional development include Shanghai, Singapore, Japan, Finland, Canada,
Luxembourg, Spain, and Hungary. Shanghai teachers are expected to engage in 240 hours of
professional development in five years (OECD, 2012b). Because so much professional
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development is involved for Shanghai teachers, they are seen as autonomous professionals who
can independently handle any difficult teaching situation (OECD, 2012b). Singapore teachers are
entitled to 100 hours of professional development per year to constantly keep improving their
teaching practice (OECD, 2012c). Teachers can complete their 100 hours in several years
(OECD, 2012c). Each school also funds growth by giving teachers the opportunity to go abroad
to learn the aspects of education in different countries (OECD, 2012c). Professional development
is required for Japan as well. Each local school board decides a minimum number of hours
teachers must spend on professional development each year (Top Performing Systems).
Teachers must also prove they are up-to-date with their practices and skills every ten years to
renew their teaching certificates (Top Performing Systems). Daily in-service training is also
provided by prefectural boards every five, ten, and twenty years into teacher’s careers (Top
Performing Systems). Continuous professional development is required for Finnish teachers
throughout their career. Professional development requirements are different from municipality
to municipality. Time spent on professional development varies from area to area, but the
national government is required fund at least three days of mandatory professional development
each year (Top Performing Systems). Finnish teachers spend seven days a year on professional
development, on average (Top Performing Systems). Different professional development
requirements vary from location to location in Canada, although all provincial Ministries of
Education require and support ongoing teacher training efforts (Top Performing Systems).
Professional development programs are extensive and range from content knowledge issues to
important social issues present in the classroom (Top Performing Systems).
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Portugal only has a minimum requirement of 15 hours of in-service teacher education
(Portuguesa, 2000). Professional development is largely an individual choice in Portugal that is
driven by career advancement (Portuguesa, 2000). The National Staff Development Council
reports that in 2008 the percentage of teachers in the United States who had completed more than
33 hours of professional development on the content of the subject that they teach was only
23.8% (Wei, Darling-Hammond, & Adamson, 2010). Only 7.7% of teachers received over 33
hours of development on reading instruction, and only 2% had over 33 hours of development on
student management in the classroom (Wei, Darling-Hammond, & Adamson, 2010).
Luxembourg has an exact minimum number of hours that each teacher is expected to attend
professional development, and does not offer any incentives for their completion (Key Data on
Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). In Spain, each territory is responsible for their own
professional development plans. Additional pay allowances are paid every five or six years to
teachers who participate in a minimum number of professional development activities (Key Data
on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). Teachers in Spain can earn up to a maximum of five
additional salary supplements throughout their careers for taking part in professional
development (Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe). In Hungary, teachers are
required to attend 120 hours of professional development every seven years to continue teaching
(Key Data on Teachers and School Leaders in Europe).
From the resources I consulted, it does not appear that Brazil or Argentina require any
professional development minimums. In Indonesia, in-service training has only been facilitated
to a small number of teachers as training accommodations can be expensive (Supriatna).
Professional development is gaining importance in Peru, but teachers are not yet required to have
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a personal plan (Education in Peru: History, Current Systems and Equity). This data seems to
indicate that the amount of professional development required is an important indicator for
educational outcomes, but quality of the development seems to play a large role. Portugal and
the United States do not have professional development requirements for the overall system, but
still outperform the three other middle-performing systems that do require it. The date collected
on teacher quality as seen in Figure F leads me to believe that there is a high-correlation between
educational outcomes and recruiting teachers from the top pool of graduates, the respect-level of
teachers in society, and teacher selectivity.
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Policy Recommendations
In summary, it appears that there are four factors that have a high correlation with topeducational performance. These include ensuring that the teaching force is recruited from the top
pool of graduates, insuring the teaching field is held to a high-level of prestige in society, holding
a high selectivity process for teachers, and holding a deep belief that all students are capable of
achieving at the highest levels. In order to move middle and low-performing systems into a
higher trajectory, the top educational priority should be to incorporate the four top-factors into
their individual systems.
There is one global network in existence today that works to expand educational
opportunity and has the four educational top-factors engrained in their organization—Teach For
All. Teach For All states, “The world’s most disadvantaged students need as many teachers as
possible with a vision for defying expectations. We need teachers who are willing to rise above
the challenges they face, and make up for weaknesses in schools and systems. Their leadership,
high standards, and firm belief in their students’ abilities inspire those students to believe in
themselves and strive for formerly unimaginable goals” (TFA). The organizations that make up
the Teach For All network enlist their nation’s most outstanding future leaders into a teaching
corps to work towards close the education gap in their own countries (TFA). Teach For All
believes that there are high similarities in the nature of problems from system to system, so by
working together they can better combat educational issues (TFA). Teach For All networking
partner organizations that are an existence for the systems chosen in this study include Teach For
America, Empieza por Educar, Enseña Perú, and Teach For Qatar (TFA). There are thirty-five
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current Teach For All partner organizations in existence—others include programs such as Teach
For Thailand, TEACH South Africa, Teach For Lebanon, and Teach for the Philippines (TFA).
Each Teach For All partner organization enlists top-graduates into their teaching corps
through a highly selective process (TFA). Teach For America has a selection model that enlists
corps members based-off of nine traits they have seen in the most successful teachers. These
traits include demonstrated leadership ability, a deep belief in the potential of all kids regardless
of their background, strong achievement in academics, volunteer settings, and extracurricular
activities, perseverance in the face of challenges, commitment to reaching goals, excellent
critical thinking skills, the ability to motivate others, excellent organizational ability, and respect
of diverse experiences and backgrounds (TFA). Teach For America is seen as a highly
prestigious program; in fact in 2010 18% of Yale students applied for the corps (New York
Times). Through its selection model and mission, Teach For America encompasses the four topindicators of performance outcomes—high teacher selectivity, recruiting from a top cohort of
graduates, high-prestige level, and belief in all-children regardless of socio-economic status.
Because the different Teach For All network organizations recruit leaders who are
citizens of the countries themselves, it can be better ensured that each country has their own
particular cultural contexts integrated into the curriculum. In Teach For America, there are
10,600 current program teachers (TFA). That means that out of all teachers in the United States,
there are at least 10,600 current teaching professionals that went through a highly selective hiring
process, have a deep belief in all children’s potential, are held to a high-level of prestige, and
were recruited from a top-pool of graduates. But to truly move an education system into a higher
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trajectory and create substantially greater outcomes, we need all teachers to be placed in the
classroom based off of the four top-performance indicators—not just a small cohort of
individuals that make up organizations such as Teach For America. By going a step beyond the
Teach For America selection model and recruiting top-students to go through intensive teacher
training with the incentive of high salary, we could make huge educational gains all around the
world.
My policy recommendation for middle and low-performing system is that each system
should implement a highly-selective teacher recruitment model that incorporates intensive
teacher training and continues with high-quality teacher development. Each system should
recruit from its top-graduates and raise salary to a rate that is competitive with other professional
career choices for that region. By offering a competitive salary, regions can ensure that the
highest-achieving students are not tempted to go into higher-paying fields instead. It is not a
question of how a region can afford to allocate money to improve teacher salary—but a question
of: how can a region not afford it. Education should be seen as an investment; high-education
system performance can become a gateway towards greater economic development. Following
teacher salary raises and high-standards held for prospective teachers, high-teacher prestige level
is likely to follow as well.
One common complaint of education reform plans is that the reforms do not take into
account a country’s own cultural context. Tensions may easily begin between the local
indigenous culture and the policy-decision makers (Pereira, 2013). This was very true of
educational reform efforts in Qatar. Locals in the Qatar community believed previous reform
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efforts to be a model adopted from another country, and not one in which was suitable for the
local context (Pereira, 2013). For this reason, each education system’s education training
program should be created by top-education experts from around the world who could work with
educational leaders from each country to ensure a training program is created that is appropriate
for a country’s cultural context.
United States Program Recommendation
A program such as the one described above that incorporates all top-performance
education factors could be very viable improvement option for the United States. The United
States could begin a highly-selective new teacher training program with the incentive that
students who complete the program would earn a salary competitive with that of other
professions. This competitive salary idea is similar to an idea utilized in Singapore’s system. In
Singapore the starting salaries of other professions are monitored and teacher salary is adjusted
to ensure it is as equally attractive as other professions (OECD, 2012c). Japan also used a similar
reform measure in the past, raising teacher salaries to 30% higher than other public servants.
When teachers in Japan begin their service today, they are paid as well as new engineers (OECD,
2011c).
This program could have the potential to create an entire new brand of teacher prestige in
America. Students could apply to this new teacher training program in a similar manner that
students apply to American nursing schools. Students would have the option of beginning the
program after their second year of undergrad, or could also apply after they have already
completed a bachelor’s degree in another field. Prospective-teachers would have to take a
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standardized test as a requirement that is similar to the GRE or GMAT, and only if a student
receives a certain high-level score could a student be considered for the program. The
prospective-teacher would then under-go an extensive application and interview process to
ensure that the individual meets the high-quality selection model they are looking for. That
selection model would be similar to that of the Teach For America’s, as it selects high-quality
individuals who also have a deep belief in the potential of all children.
As inspired by Singapore, a major characteristic of this reform is that the key does not
just lie in the training program itself, but in identifying and developing strong, young talent
(OECD, 2012c). Like in Singapore, more effort would be put in the front-end of recruiting topquality individuals and then giving them effective training and continual support (OECD,
2012c). The new selection process for the United States stems from Finland as well, where only
the best and brightest are able to make it through the teacher selection process (OECD, 2014a).
The program would be an academically rigorous three year program all together, while
two of those years would be spent in the classroom. Training classes would be taught by a cohort
of expert educators from around the world who have worked together to develop an extensive
program based on pedagogy agreed to best engage student learning. In Finland and other high
performing systems, teaching is seen as a profession that relies on scientific knowledge and skills
gained through university studies (OECD, 2014a). This U.S. program would work under the
same scientific approach as Finland, where teachers diagnose problems, apply evidence-based
solutions, and analyze the impact of their procedure (OECD, 2014a).
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After the second year in training a student would graduate with their degree, but to
become certified they would have to complete a classroom internship with a highly-skilled
teacher. Japan offers a similar apprenticeship program in which master teachers are given a year
off from their teaching jobs to supervise their apprentices in the classroom (OECD, 2011c).
Prospective-teachers would also receive regular teacher salary offered by the school district
during their internship year. The internship salary from this program is adapted from an aspect of
Singapore’s system, in which prospective teachers receive a monthly salary competitive with that
of new-graduates in other professions while completing their training program (OECD, 2012c).
Once a student completed their year of internship, they would officially complete the teacher
training program and receive the new, competitive salary each year as a teacher.
To continue receiving the competitive salary, teachers would be required to complete
fifty hours of professional development a year designed by the training program educators, and
also engage in collaborative teachers circles and planning with others in the training cohort
weekly. This area of the new U.S. training plan stems from high-performing systems’ high
teacher development requirements.
People who are already classroom teachers would be welcome to apply for the teacher
program as well. If they meet the same application testing and selection model qualifications as
stated earlier, they could have the option of completing an online teacher training program
during after-school hours. After completing the program, they too would have the new,
competitive salary. The training program could start with one cohort of students, but continue to
grow larger and larger over time. Because teachers who graduate from this training program
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would have extensive culturally-responsive teaching methods and qualification measures, this
program could very much begin to change how teachers are viewed in American society.
Growing a high-quality teacher workforce with a deep belief in all children’s potential would
very likely lead to high student outcomes.
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Recommendations For Future Research
Important future research on this topic would include the economic benefits of the
teaching policy recommendations suggested in this paper. It is reasonable to assume that an
increase in academic performance of students in the United States using the proposed teacher
recruitment and development model would increase wages and GDP for America. Improved
wages and GDP would also mean increased tax revenue for federal and state governments. This
increase in revenue could in part be the basis to fund improvements in teacher compensation.
Likely the economic benefits will be much larger than the cost for improved teacher
compensation, so future research must be done that measures how improvements in academic
performance translate into improved economic conditions. This then could become a viable
strategy that policy makers and the American public can support.
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Conclusion
By investing in structural reforms in education, we have the potential to better student
opportunity and economic growth for all regions in the world (OECD, 2012c). Pinpointing
strengths and weaknesses in a region’s system can help us re-shape areas that have neededgrowth. As discussed at the beginning of this paper, creating an exact combination of education
practices that would work for all systems around the world is not possible. However, when
trends emerge for the highest performing systems, those trends cannot be ignored. As trends
have revealed in this research, a deep belief in all children’s potential, high teacher-selectivity,
top-graduate recruitment, and teacher prestige are incredibly important aspects of an education
system that are correlated with high-outcomes. If each middle and low-performing system
incorporates the four traits correlated with high-performance into their schools, it would give
each region a firm foundation towards educational success.
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APPENDIX A: HIGH PERFORMING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
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High-Performing Education Systems

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Country

2012 Combined Math
Reading, and Science
PISA Score

Shanghai-China
Singapore
Hong Kong-China
South Korea
Japan
Chinese Taipei
Finland
Estonia
Liechtenstein
Macao-China
Canada
Poland
Netherlands
Switzerland
Vietnam
Germany
Ireland
Australia
Belgium
New Zealand
United Kingdom

1,733
1,666
1,661
1,628
1,621
1,606
1,588
1,578
1,576
1,568
1,566
1,562
1,556
1,555
1,547
1,546
1,546
1,537
1,529
1,528
1,507
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2012 GDP
per capita
$12,784
$52,052
32,742
$22,590
$46,731
$65,453
$45,694
$16,833
$134,617
$49,756
$51,206
$12,710
$45,960
$78,928
$1,755
$42,597
$45,921
$67,442
$43,399
$38,637
$38,920

APPENDIX B: MIDDLE PERFORMING EDUCATION SYSTEMS

74

Middle-Performing Education Systems

Rank
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Country

2012 Combined Math
Reading, and Science
PISA Score

Austria
Czech Republic
France
Slovenia
Denmark
Norway
Portugal
Latvia
United States
Luxembourg
Italy
Spain
Hungary
Iceland
Lithuania
Croatia
Sweden
Russian Federation
Israel
Slovak Republic

1,502
1,500
1,499
1,496
1,494
1,488
1,488
1,482
1,476
1,469
1,469
1,468
1,459
1,454
1,452
1,447
1,446
1,443
1,422
1,416
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2012 GDP
per capita
$18,690
$39,746
$22,059
$56,364
$99,636
$2,175
$13,947
$13,947
$51,749
$103,858
$33,816
$28,274
$12,560
$42,339
$14,172
$13,879
$55,040
$14,037
$32,564
$24,600

APPENDIX C: LOW-PERFORMING EDUCATION SYSTEMS
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Low-Performing Education Systems
Rank
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Country

2012 Combined Math
Reading, and Science
PISA Score

Greece
Turkey
Serbia
Cyprus
United Arab
Romania
Bulgaria
Thailand
Chile
Costa Rica
Mexico
Kazahstan
Monterero
Malaysia
Uruaguay
Brazil
Jordan
Tunisia
Argentina
Albania
Columbia
Indonesia
Qatar
Peru

1,397
1,386
1,340
1,327
1,324
1,322
1,321
1,312
1,309
1,274
1,252
1,250
1,242
1,239
1,236
1,206
1,194
1,190
1,190
1,185
1,178
1,153
1,148
1,125
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2012 GDP
per capita
$22,442
$10,666
$5,190
$26,070
$41,692
$8,437
$6,977
$5,480
$15,452
$9,386
$9,749
$12,121
$7,041
$10,432
$14,703
$11,340
$4,909
$4,237
$11,573
$4,000
$7,748
$3,557
$93,825
$6,796
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Education Systems Chosen For Study

Rank

1
2
5
7
11
28
30
31
33
34
57
60
63
64
65

Country
ShanghaiChina
Singapore
Japan
Finland
Canada
Portugal
United States
Luxembourg
Spain
Hungary
Brazil
Argentina
Indonesia
Qatar
Peru

2012 Combined
Math Reading, and
Science PISA Score
1,733
1,666
1,621
1,588
1,566
1,488
1,476
1,469
1,468
1,459
1,206
1,190
1,153
1,148
1,125
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2012 GDP
per capita

$12,784
$52,052
$46,731
$45,694
$51,206
$13,947
$51,749
$103,858
$28,274
$12,560
$11,340
$11,573
$3,557
$93,825
$6,796
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Shanghia-China
Majority of
principals and
teachers report that
they have
responsibility for
the task of
determining course
content.
Majority of
principals and
teachers report that
they do not have
responsibility for
the task of
determing course
content.
Majority of
principals and
teachers are given
the responsibility of
choosing which
textbooks are used
in the classroom
Majority of
principals and
teachers are not
given the
responsibility of
choosing which
textbooks are used
in the classroom
Majority of teachers
and principals
believe they have
considerable
responsibility for
establishing
assessment policies
Majority of teachers
and principals do
not believe they
have considerable
responsibility for
establishing
assessment policies
Majority of
principals and
teachers are given
the responsibility of
deciding which
courses are offered
in their schools

Singapore

Japan

X

X

Portugal

United States

Spain Hungary

Brazil Argentina Indonesia Qatar Peru

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Luxembourg

X

X

X

X

Finland Canada

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Shanghia-China

Singapore

Majority of
principals and
teachers are not
given the
responsibility of
deciding which
courses are offered
in their schools
National
Assessment given at
upper-secondary
level
National
Assessment given at
lower-secondary
level
Compulsory
instruction time for
students above
OECD average
Compulsory
instruction time for
students below
OECD average

Japan

X

Finland Canada

Portugal

United States

Luxembourg

X

Spain Hungary

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Brazil Argentina Indonesia Qatar Peru

X

X

X

Information Is Not
Available

Answer Varies
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Shanghia-China
Funded predominantly
by central government
Funded predominantly
by state or local
government
Funded by combination
of central and local
government

Singapore Japan Finland Canada Portugal United States Luxembourg Spain Hungary Brazil Argentina

X

X

X

X
X

Expenditure on
educational institutions
as a percentage of GDP
is higher than OECD
average (6.1%)
Expenditure on
educational institutions
as a percentage of GDP
is lower than OECD
average (6.1%)
Education goals
determined
predominantly by state
or local government
Ministry of Education
determines national
education goals
Majority of students in
government or public
schools
Majority of students in
independent private
schools
Both Academic and
Vocational Secondary
school tracks
Only Academic
Secondary school track

Indonesia Qatar Peru

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

APPENDIX G: EDUCATION EQUALITY VARIABLES

85

Shanghia-China
Student-teacher ratio amo ng
students in so cio eco no mially disadvantaged
scho o ls higher than studentteacher ratio amo ng
students in so cio eco no mically advantaged
scho o ls
Student-teacher ratio amo ng
students in so cio eco no mially disadvantaged
scho o ls lo wer than studentteacher ratio amo ng
students in so cio eco no mically advantaged
scho o ls
P ercentage o f students in
bo tto m quarter o f P ISA
index fo r eco no mic, cultural,
and so cial status who
perfo rm in the to p quarter o f
students o n P ISA abo ve
OECD average (6.38%)

Singapore Japan Finland Canada Portugal

United States Luxembourg Spain Hungary

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Brazil Argentina Indonesia Qatar Peru

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P ercentage o f students in
bo tto m quarter o f P ISA
index fo r eco no mic, cultural,
and so cial status who
perfo rm in the to p quarter o f
students o n P ISA belo w
OECD average (6.38%)

X
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X

X

X

X

X

Shanghia-China

Singapore Japan Finland Canada Portugal

P ercentage o f immigrant
students in so cio eco no mically disadvantaged
scho o ls abo ve OECD
average (15.7%)
P ercentage o f immigrant
students in so cio eco no mically disadvantaged
scho o ls belo w OECD
average (15.7%)
A verage P ISA perfo rmance
amo ng students attending
scho o ls lo cated in a large
city has mo re than a 10 po int
difference than students
attending scho o ls in a village
o r rural area
A verage P ISA perfo rmance
amo ng students attending
scho o ls lo cated in a large
city has less than a 10 po int
difference than students
attending scho o ls in a village
o r rural area

United States Luxembourg Spain Hungary

X

X

X

X

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

NA

NA

NA

X
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Brazil Argentina Indonesia Qatar Peru

NA

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Shanghia-China

Singapore

Japan Finland Canada Portugal United States

Luxembourg Spain Hungary Brazil Argentina Indonesia

Teachers are
recruited from
the top pool of
graduates

X

X

X

X

X

Teaching is
considered a
highly-respected
position in
society

X

X

X

X

X

Receiving a
teaching position
is highlyselective

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Prospective
teachers must
graduate from a
country's
teacher
education
program
All teachers
must hold a
teachingcertificate

89

Qatar Peru

X

X

X

X

X

Shanghia-China
Teachers must
hold a postsecondary
degree to teach
Teachers must
have a masters
degree to teach
Ratio of upper
secondary
teachers
salaries at top of
scale to starting
salary is above
OECD average
(1.62)
Ratio of upper
secondary
teachers
salaries at top of
scale to starting
salary is below
OECD average
(1.62)
Teachers are
required to
complete
extensive
professional
development

X

Singapore
X

Japan Finland Canada Portugal United States
X

X

X

X

X

Luxembourg Spain Hungary Brazil Argentina Indonesia
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Information is not
available

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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X

X

X

Qatar Peru
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